


Understanding the velocity of money in the USA, as background to macro- forecasting


A presentation by Professor Tim Congdon CBE, Chair of the Institute of International Monetary Research, in July 2024

US broad money and nominal GDP, 1918 - 2019 - Quarterly data, levels in \$b.




The data themselves say nothing about the direction of causation, but...


US broad money and nominal GDP, 1918 - 2019 - Quarterly data, levels in \$b.




The same data presented with a logarithmic scale.

The only multiyear period of significant falls in the quantity of money was the Great Depression.











Income velocity of circulation in the USA, in the decade up to and including the 2020 money explosion






The forecast I made in late March/early April 2020 - that Federal Reserve (and US Treasury) actions would lead to inflation in the 5% - 10% area turned on the expected reversion to mean of (the change in) money velocity. The evidence for the stationarity of (the change in) money velocity was clear and overwhelming from over a century of data.


Velocity in the USA before and after Covid



The process of mean reversion takes time



Income velocity up to Covid
 Income velocity during Covid and later



Friedman proposed a roughly two-year lag between changes in money growth and inflation, a view which worked well in the latest cycle. However, it is clear that – in the USA – the level of velocity had not, even in late 2023, returned to the pre-Covid figure. (It was about 5% beneath it.) Monetary disequilibrium – after a shock to money growth - may persist for up to four or five years.



Money growth collapsed in the USA to almost zero in spring 2022, where it remains. In summer 2022 I forecast – correctly – that this made possible inflation of as low as 2% by the time of the US Presidential election. But I wrongly said a recession would be needed to deliver that fall in inflation. Asset prices were weak in late 2022 and early 2023, but have since been resilient or even strong.


still *rising* in 2023 and early 2024, despite zero money growth at the

US house prices


time.

US house prices (purchase-only, monthly)

3-month annualised rate of change, %




The mean reversion of velocity: the Eurozone



— Income velocity up to Covid — — Income velocity during and after Covid

The mean reversion of velocity: the UK



Key ideas at work



- Key idea in the modern quantity theory of money is the underlying stability of money-holding behaviour by households, companies and non-bank financial institutions.
- So the desired ratio of money to income doesn't change very much, and neither does the equilibrium velocity of money.
- In practice the data show that the *change in velocity* (not the level) is a stationary series, with reversion to the mean, where the mean value of the change of velocity is low over most medium and long runs.
- This property of the economy is found universally, so that the quantity theory of money is an always-and-everywhere theory.